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Abstract
Once considered essential to the explanation of electromagnetic
phenomena, the ether was eventually discarded after the advent of
special relativity. The lack of empirical signature of realist interpre-
tative schemes of quantum mechanics, like Bohmian trajectories, has
led some to conclude that, just like the ether, they can be dispensed
with, replaced by the corresponding emergence of the concept of infor-
mation. Although devices like Bohmian trajectories and the ether do
present important analogies, I argue that there is also a crucial differ-
ence, related to distinct explanatory functions of quantum mechanics.
KEY WORDS: Bohmian trajectories, ether, information, quantum me-
chanics, interpretation.
1 Introduction
Quantum information theory has been one of the most active areas of devel-
opment of quantum mechanics in the past two decades. The realization that
transfer protocols based on quantum entanglement may be absolutely secure
has opened new windows in the field of cryptography (Bennett & Brassard,
1984). And the development of quantum algorithms thought to be exponen-
tially faster than their best classical counterparts has drawn great interest in
the construction of quantum computers (Shor, 1994). These face up extraor-
dinary challenges on the experimental side (Vandersypen et al., 2001). But
attempts to build them are likely to throw much light on the fundamental
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process of decoherence (Zurek, 1991) and perhaps on the limits of quantum
mechanics itself (’t Hooft, 1999; Leggett, 2002).
Along with quantum information theory came also a reemphasis of the
view that the wave function (or state vector, or density matrix) properly
represents knowledge, or information (Rovelli, 1996; Fuchs & Peres, 2000;
Fuchs, 2002). This is often called the epistemic view of quantum states. On
what the wave function is knowledge of, proponents of the epistemic view do
not necessarily agree. The variant most relevant to the present discussion is
that rather than referring to objective properties of microscopic objects (such
as electrons, photons, etc.), the wave function encapsulates probabilities of
results of eventual macroscopic measurements. The Hilbert space formalism
is taken as complete, and its objects in no need of a realistic interpreta-
tion. Additional constructs, like value assignments (van Fraassen, 1991; Ver-
maas, 1999), multiple worlds (Everett, 1957; DeWitt, 1970; Wallace, 2003),
or Bohmian trajectories (Bohm, 1952; Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Holland, 1993)
are viewed as superfluous at best.
The methodological rule calling to discard additional constructs to the
Hilbert space has been likened to the one that led to abandon the concept of
the ether in the early part of the twentieth century1 (Bub, 2004, 2005; Bohr,
Mottelson, & Ulfbeck, 2004). H. A. Lorentz and his contemporaries viewed
electromagnetic phenomena as taking place in a hypothetical medium called
the ether. From this, Lorentz developed a description of electromagnetism
in moving reference frames, and he found that the motion is undetectable
(Lorentz, 1909). Following Einstein’s formulation of the electrodynamics of
moving bodies (Einstein, 1905), the ether was recognized as playing no role,
and was henceforth discarded. So should it be, according to most proponents
of the epistemic view of quantum states, with interpretations of quantum
mechanics which posit observer-independent elements of reality. They pre-
dict no empirical differences with the Hilbert space formalism, and therefore
should be discarded.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse, in their respective contexts,
the explanatory roles of the ether and additional constructs to the Hilbert
space formalism. To be specific, and because earlier discussions have largely
focussed on them, I shall formulate my argument in terms of Bohmian tra-
1Of course the chronology of added constructs is reversed in the two episodes. Ether
theories predated special relativity, whereas Bohmian trajectories came after the Hilbert
space formalism. Cushing (1998) has argued that history could plausibly have been re-
versed in the latter episode.
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jectories, without however implying any fundamental commitment to that
choice.2 I will first recall that Bohmian trajectories coexist rather well with
the notion of a preferred reference frame, which the ether traditionally de-
fines. I will next point out what was involved in the transition between ether
theories and special relativity. The function of Bohmian trajectories will
then be investigated, in connection with two distinct explanatory roles of
quantum mechanics. This will evince a crucial difference between Bohmian
trajectories and the ether, and illustrate why interpretative schemes cannot
be dispensed with in quantum mechanics.
2 Quantum mechanics and special relativity
The ether has long been viewed as defining a preferred inertial frame of
reference. In this sense, it can find room in the conceptual structure of
quantum mechanics, at least in some of the ways the formalism is presented.
Take, for instance, the theory’s highly influential articulation proposed by
von Neumann (1932). There the wave function of a quantum system evolves
in two very different ways. Outside the context of measurements, it obeys
the Schro¨dinger equation or, equivalently, it evolves through the action of a
unitary operator (von Neumann’s process 2). At the end of a measurement,
however, it stochastically transforms into one of the eigenfunctions of the
observable being measured (process 1, or collapse).3 That evolution is not
unitary, and does not obey the Schro¨dinger equation.
It is not difficult (for one particle at least) to make process 2 consistent
with the special theory of relativity. One just has to replace the Schro¨dinger
equation by the Dirac equation. Process 1, however, is much more tricky.
The wave function of a quantum system usually covers the whole of three-
dimensional space, that is, its support is unbounded. Since the collapse is
taken to occur instantaneously (or very nearly so), the wave function, as a
consequence of measurement, changes values everywhere at the same time.
It is very difficult to make this process relativistically covariant. Indeed wave
function collapse seems to single out a preferred inertial reference frame.
Due to the statistical character of the predictions of quantum mechanics,
2See Tumulka (2004) and Brown and Wallace (2005) for two different recent assessments
of Bohmian mechanics.
3Von Neumann really writes that the pure state density matrix transforms into a mix-
ture, but for a given quantum system, only one component of the mixture obtains.
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wave function collapse does not, as is well known, allow the transfer of infor-
mation faster than the speed of light. In this sense, at least, it is consistent
with special relativity. It would thus seem that the frame being singled out
cannot be determined experimentally.
Similar considerations can be made in the context of Bohmian mechanics.
Consider a set of N particles of masses ma and charges ea, in an electromag-
netic field specified by the four-potential Aµ. The Dirac wave function Ψ
then has 4N components, which if needed can be specified by N -tuples of
four-valued indices. Let γaµ represent Dirac matrices acting on the a
th index,
and let αak = γa0γak. The Dirac equation can then be written as
−
i
c
∂Ψ
∂t
+
∑
a
{
ea
h¯
A0(ra, t)Ψ− iαak
∂Ψ
∂xak
+
ea
h¯
αakA
k(ra, t)Ψ +
mac
h¯
γa0Ψ
}
= 0. (1)
Eq. (1) entails that
∂j0
∂t
+ c
∑
a
∂jak
∂xak
= 0, (2)
where
j0 = Ψ
†Ψ, jak = Ψ
†αakΨ. (3)
Bohmian trajectories can be introduced by specifying that the three-velocity
of particle a at the space-time point (ra, t) is given by
via = c j
i
a(j
0)−1. (4)
It can be shown (Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Holland, 1993) that the magnitude of
the velocity never exceeds c, and that if particles are distributed according
to the probability density Ψ†Ψ at a given time, they will be distributed
according to Ψ†Ψ at any other time.
The N -particle Dirac equation being relativistically covariant (Bohm &
Hiley, 1993), it can be used indifferently in any inertial reference frame. Prob-
abilities obtained in one frame transform correctly into probabilities obtained
in any other frame. Since, however, the quantities (j0, jia) do not make up
a four-vector (for N > 1), the Bohmian trajectories are not covariant. That
is, trajectories computed in frame Σ through Eqs. (4), when transformed
into Σ′ by means of the Lorentz transformations, will not match trajectories
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computed in Σ′ directly through (4). Hence Eqs. (4) can hold in only one
inertial reference frame (modulo rotations and space-time translations).
The upshot is that Bohmian trajectories, like von Neumann’s collapse,
naturally coexist with the ether construed as defining a preferred, albeit un-
observable, reference frame.4 There remains to see whether the justification
of the former, in quantum mechanics, is of the same nature as that of the
latter, in electromagnetic theories.
3 Ether and field
The concept of ether has a long history (Whittaker, 1951; Darrigol, 2000),
and it was used in a number of different contexts. In one of these, mainly
developed in the nineteenth century, the ether was viewed as a substratum
wherein electric and magnetic phenomena take place. Much effort was spent
on detailed mechanical models of the substratum. It is not the purpose of this
paper to recapitulate them, but it may be worthwhile to recall one proposed
by Maxwell, as he described it in an 1861 letter to W. Thomson (quoted in
Whittaker, 1951, p. 250).
I suppose that the “magnetic medium” is divided into small portions
or cells, the divisions or cell walls being composed of a single stratum
of spherical particles, these particles being “electricity.” The sub-
stance of the cells I suppose to be highly elastic, both with respect to
compression and distorsion; and I suppose the connection between the
cells and the particles in the cell walls to be such that there is perfect
rolling without slipping between them and that they act on each other
tangentially.
I then find that if the cells are set in rotation, the medium exerts a
stress equivalent to a hydrostatic pressure combined with a longitudi-
nal tension along the lines of axes of rotation.
Maxwell goes on drawing detailed analogies between his cells and cell walls
and “a system of magnets, electric currents and bodies capable of magnetic
induction.” It should be pointed out, however, that such models played a
less important role in Maxwell’s great treatise (1873), which relied more on a
Lagrangian formulation. Model building was progressively abandoned in the
4Maudlin (1994) gives a detailed argument why the introduction of a preferred frame
may be the more rational choice to make in a quantum-mechanical theory.
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most fruitful late nineteenth century contributions to electromagnetic theory,
those of Lorentz in particular.
Lorentz’s largely definitive views on electromagnetic theory were ex-
pounded in his 1906 Columbia University lectures, published a few years
later. His ontology is threefold: there is ponderable matter,5 there are electric
charges (“electrons”), and there is the ether, “the receptacle of electromag-
netic energy and the vehicle for many and perhaps for all the forces acting
on ponderable matter” (Lorentz, 1909, p. 30). The ether is supposed to be
at rest, and this determines an absolute inertial reference frame.
As there was no reason to expect that the earth is at rest with respect
to the ether,6 the question arose as to how to describe electromagnetic phe-
nomena in a moving frame. The calculation would go roughly as follows.
Maxwell’s equations, assumed to hold in the frame where the ether is at
rest, would be used to compute the electric and magnetic fields of moving
electrons and matter. These fields would act back on charges and matter,
and (partly at least) determine their configuration. It could be shown, in
particular, that if all forces in moving matter shared the characteristics of
electric and magnetic forces, the so-called Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction
would naturally follow.7
In this context, Lorentz and others were able to prove a rather remarkable
result. Suppose we introduce spatial coordinates r′ at rest in the moving
frame, and define a “local time” t′ as t′ = t−(r′·w)/c2, wherew is the velocity
of the moving frame. Furthermore, introduce new electric and magnetic fields
related to the old ones by what is now called a Lorentz transformation.8
Then the numerical values of the new fields coincide with values of the (old)
fields that would be obtained from electrons and matter having a similar
configuration in the frame where the ether is at rest. Moreover, the new
fields and space-time coordinates satisfy Maxwell’s equations.
5Lorentz does not commit himself on whether all matter is made of electric charges,
nor on whether all mass has an electromagnetic origin.
6Everyone realized that if the earth is at rest in the ether now, it should not be in a few
months, due to its orbital velocity around the sun. Unless perhaps the ether is dragged
along the motion, but this causes numerous other problems.
7Brown (2001) points out that a simple contraction is not the only deformation that
can account for the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, a fact which Lorentz,
and probably FitzGerald, fully realized.
8The argument was first made with terms of first order in w/c, and then more generally.
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The above result was interpreted, by Lorentz and most generally by
Poincare´, as showing that motion with respect to the ether is undetectable
(Poincare´, 1905; Paty, 1993). Yet Lorentz and Poincare´ never abandoned
the ether, and Lorentz maintained that the local time is just a definition, the
true time always referring to the rest frame of the ether.9 It was Einstein’s
fundamental contribution to view the local time as the time genuinely mea-
sured in the moving frame, with no more and no less reality than the time
measured in any other inertial frame. Suddenly the ether was seen as playing
no useful role, and was eventually discarded.
Many now believe that Lorentz’s conception of (unobservable) true time
and absolute rest, and Einstein’s notion of complete equivalence between
inertial frames, are both logically consistent and in agreement with empirical
results (Gru¨nbaum, 1973; Bell, 1976). Yet in less than a decade, most people
adopted Einstein’s views (Pais, 1982). The great simplicity of Einstein’s
purely kinematical approach and the fact that it allowed complete freedom
in the choice of the inertial frame where calculations would be made no doubt
contributed to that decision.
It is important to realize, however, that the rejection of the ether has
not left a void in its stead. From Maxwell’s quotation to Lorentz’s final
views, we have seen that the ether was progressively deprived of much of
its complicated mechanical attributes. There only remained something to
define a preferred frame and transmit the electric and magnetic forces. But
as the ether was discarded, the electromagnetic field acquired by itself an
independent reality. For Einstein, this way of seeing the field was one of
the most important consequences of the conceptual development leading to
special relativity (Einstein, 1949; Paty, 1993).
Even before the full development of quantum mechanics and quantum
field theory, the electromagnetic field was generally considered as being real,
as anything carrying energy and momentum is. The ether was discarded in
its role as defining absolute time and absolute motion. The methodological
choice, however, was not one between the ether and nothing, but one between
the ether as sustaining the field and a self-sustaining field.
9Poincare´ (1898) saw the conventional character of the simultaneity of distant events.
Later he recognized that clocks synchronized by means of light signals mark the local time,
which however he contrasted with the true time (Pais, 1982, Chap. 6).
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4 Bohmian trajectories and information
Bohmian trajectories and the ether are elements of two different theoretical
structures. They present both analogies and differences. The analogy that
is relevant here is that neither Bohmian trajectories in quantum mechanics
nor the ether in special relativity lead to specific empirical consequences.
Does that mean that the trajectories, or other interpretative devices, have in
quantum mechanics the same status as the ether in special relativity? And if
one can dispense with such devices, is there something which, like the field,
plays the role they would otherwise have?
To examine these questions, it is appropriate to start with the following
observation. Although all measurements are made by means of macroscopic
apparatus, quantum mechanics is used, as an explanatory theory, in two
different ways: it is meant to explain (i) nonclassical correlations between
macroscopic objects and [ultimately through quantum field theory] (ii) the
small-scale structure of macroscopic objects. That these two functions are
distinct is shown by considering a hypothetical situation where only one of
them is operating.10
Consider a world which, as far as macroscopic objects are concerned, is
very similar to our own. By this I mean that the laws of classical mechanics,
classical electrodynamics, and thermodynamics apply to these objects with
at least as much generality as in our world. They may even apply better, in
the sense that their scope may reach scales smaller than the 10−9 to 10−10 m
characteristic of molecules and atoms in our world. I shall not, however,
specify the microscopic structure of the hypothetical world, except for one
restriction soon to be made.
In the hypothetical world, the macroscopic objects sometimes behave in
ways that cannot be explained by the classical theories. In one class of
situations, for instance, there are devices (much like our Geiger counters)
that click when specific objects (like our radioactive materials) are brought
nearby. We label the former D and the latter E. Although the clicks are
random, their probability distributions follow well-defined and reproducible
laws. We assume that these laws coincide with the quantum-mechanical rules
for the propagation of wave packets. If, for instance, there is some material
between E and D, the number and distribution of clicks are influenced just
10More about the world described in the following paragraphs can be found in
Marchildon (2004), where it was introduced in terms of slightly different experimental
instruments.
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like the quantum-mechanical theory of scattering predicts.
To account for these correlations, one can envisage at least two very dif-
ferent explanatory schemes. In the first one, we postulate that E emits
“particles” that are detected by D after possibly interacting with interven-
ing objects. In the second one, we postulate that D clicks in a way that
is genuinely fortuitous (Ulfbeck & Bohr, 2001; Bohr, Mottelson, & Ulfbeck,
2004), the spatiotemporal probability distribution of the clicks, however, be-
ing dependent on the distribution of various types of nearby macroscopic
objects.
Now I make the assumption (and this is the crucial way in which the hypo-
thetical world differs from our own) that the “particles” used in one explana-
tory scheme to account for the macroscopic correlations have no function
whatsoever in any attempt to explain the microscopic structure of macro-
scopic objects. That is, whether matter is discrete or continuous at micro-
scopic scales, its small-scale constituents have nothing to do with whatever
is responsible for the clicks described above.
How similar would the ether and the particles be, as explanatory devices,
in this hypothetical world? Very much indeed. Neither would have predictive
power not already contained in the alternative explanations provided by the
principle of relativity, in one case, and probabilistic correlations, in the other.
And both could be dispensed with in a rational and completely articulated
account of nature. Those who would keep the ether might do so because
of some prejudice in favour of absolute simultaneity or motion. Those who
would keep the particles might be influenced by the greater or smaller number
and types of them necessary to explain the phenomena, or might find such
contact interactions more palatable.
Let us now leave the hypothetical world and turn to the actual world,
the one we live in. Here quantum mechanics is also used to explain the
ultimate structure of macroscopic objects. Moreover, it does so with the
same mathematical tools as the ones it uses to account for the correlations
described above. That is, the state spaces and parameters associated with
the “particles” are also the ones (or at least part of the ones) associated with
the building blocks of macroscopic objects.
In this context, what is the function of Bohmian trajectories (or, for that
matter, of other interpretative schemes of quantum mechanics)? They pro-
vide us with one clear way that the particles can behave so as to reproduce
the quantum-mechanical rules and, therefore, the observable behaviour of
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macroscopic objects.11 Although they could be dispensed with in the hypo-
thetical world, they cannot in the real world unless, just like the ether was
replaced by the field, they are replaced by something that can account for
the structure of macroscopic objects.
It has been argued that the emergence of the notion of an autonomous
field, connected with the development of special relativity, has a parallel in
the emergence of the concept of information in the context of quantum me-
chanics. The motivation for this is an important result recently obtained
by Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (2003; Halvorson, 2004). Working in the
setting of C∗-algebras, these investigators characterized the quantum the-
ory by three properties: (i) kinematic independence, i.e. the commutativity
of the algebras of observables pertaining to distinct physical systems; (ii)
the noncommutativity of an individual system’s algebra of observables; and
(iii) nonlocality, i.e. the existence of entangled states for spacelike-separated
systems. They then showed that these properties are equivalent to three
information-theoretic constraints, namely, the impossibility of superluminal
information transfer, of perfect broadcasting, and of unconditionally secure
bit commitment.
Drawing on this result, Bub (2005) has proposed that quantum theory
should be treated as “a theory about the representation and manipulation of
information” (p. 557), where quantum information is “a new physical prim-
itive not reducible to the behaviour of mechanical systems (the motion of
particles and/or fields)” (p. 546). This, he argues, renders Bohmian tra-
jectories no more useful in quantum mechanics than the ether is in special
relativity (Bub, 2004, p. 262):
[J]ust as Einstein’s analysis (based on the assumption that we live in
a world in which natural processes are subject to certain constraints
specified by the principles of special relativity) shows that we do not
need the mechanical structures in Lorentz’s theory (the aether, and
the behaviour of electrons in the aether) to explain electromagnetic
phenomena, so the [Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson] analysis (based on
the assumption that we live in a world in which there are certain
constraints on the acquisition, representation, and communication of
information) shows that we do not need the mechanical structures in
Bohm’s theory (the guiding field, the behaviour of particles in the
guiding field) to explain quantum phenomena.
11Indeed from a Bohmian perspective, the trajectories are just the kind of variables that
show up in a measurement, in sharp contrast with the ether in electromagnetic theories.
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To assess the validity of this claim, one should point out that there is
a fundamental ontological difference between field and information. The
electromagnetic field, in the framework of special relativity, is an autonomous
entity that carries energy and momentum. Since Maxwell’s equations have
solutions corresponding to vanishing charge and current densities, the field
can exist, in principle, even in the complete absence of matter. This is not
the case with information, not in the sense of Shannon at least. To exist,
it needs some kind of material (or other) support. Whether in classical or
quantum mechanics, information is a functional on states of objects. It does
not live autonomously.
This means that information-theoretic considerations are relevant to the
first explanatory function of quantum mechanics, the one that pertains to
nonclassical correlations of macroscopic objects. But is information, as “a
new physical primitive,” of any help in the second explanatory function, i.e.
in accounting for the structure of macroscopic objects? It seems that no pro-
ponent of the epistemic view would go so far as suggesting that information
is a fundamental building block of nature, something objects are made of.
This is very much unlike the electromagnetic field, which at the turn of the
twentieth century was thought to account for part or even for all the mass of
charged particles (McCormmach, 1970). Hence the question about the rele-
vance of information to the second explanatory function should be answered
in the negative.12
5 Discussion
Several objections can be made to the claims that Bohmian trajectories and
the ether fulfill distinct explanatory functions, and that information is not a
fundamental entity. They must now be addressed.
I have argued that quantum mechanics is used to explain both (i) the
12Timpson (2004) has provided an in-depth analysis of the Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson
result. He first investigated the extent to which the no bit-commitment constraint is needed
in characterizing quantum mechanics in the framework of C∗-algebras. He then examined
the relevance and generality of that formalism. Closer to the aim of the present paper, he
next enquired whether viewing quantum mechanics as a theory about the manipulation of
information can constitute an interpretation in an interesting sense. Based on a distinction
between the technical and everyday senses of information, and on the observation that
“in both settings ‘information’ functions as an abstract noun, hence does not refer to a
particular or substance,” his answer is largely negative.
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nonclassical correlations between macroscopic objects and (ii) the small-scale
structure of macroscopic objects. But are these two functions really different?
Suppose, for instance, that we use the quantum theory to explain proper-
ties of a macroscopic crystal, such as its elasticity or heat capacity. We
should then make hypotheses on, among other things, the atomic structure
of the lattice and the quantum-mechanical Hamiltonian. But none of these
hypotheses can be tested directly. They are tested indirectly through their
consequences on macroscopic parameters such as elasticity constants or heat
capacity. And the values of these parameters are measured through corre-
lations established between experimental preparations and results displayed
by macroscopic pointers.
This is also the case with molecular properties. Suppose that chemi-
cal analysis has revealed that a given substance is chemically pure, so that
we ascribe its constitution to one type of molecule only. Properties of the
substance, such as its visible or infrared absorption, can then be explained
by applying the quantum theory to the electrons and nuclei making up the
molecule. But again, none of this can be tested directly. Absorption fre-
quencies, in the end, show up as readings on some macroscopic device, and
the whole experimental protocol reduces to correlations between macroscopic
preparations and macroscopic measurements.
I should readily admit that the empirical consequences of both types of
explanation provided by quantum mechanics are of the same nature. But
the explanations themselves are very different epistemologically, as was il-
lustrated in the last section by the example of the hypothetical world. The
explanation given of the structure of macroscopic objects, in terms of atomic
or subatomic constituents obeying the laws of quantum mechanics, essentially
answers the question, What happens when objects are repeatedly split? That
question seems unavoidable in a complete understanding of macroscopic ob-
jects.
In advocating the rejection of hidden variable theories, Bub (2005, p. 557)
argues that
our measuring instruments ultimately remain black boxes at some level.
That is, a quantum description will have to introduce a “cut” between
what we take to be the ultimate measuring instrument in a given
measurement process and the quantum phenomenon revealed by the
instrument, which means that the measuring instrument is treated
simply as a probabilistic source of a range of labelled events or “out-
comes”[.]
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As the phrase “at some level” indicates, our measuring instruments are not
total black boxes. Indeed we can go a long way explaining the properties
of their parts on the basis of atomic structure. Should one argue that the
atomic structure is not to be taken literally, he should be prepared to specify
at what scale ought the analysis of matter stop, or the reality of objects
dissolve.13
This brings us to a somewhat different objection to the claims being made
here. What if the structure of matter did not require explanation, or at least
could be accounted for by a very different type of explanation than the one
we are used to? It is well known that in the history of science, criteria for
what requires explanation, or what counts as a valid explanation, have often
changed (Klein, 1972; Gardner, 1979; Cushing, 1990). Gravitation through
action at a distance, considered impossible within the seventeenth-century
mechanistic worldview, became less and less problematic in the eighteenth
century (McMullin, 1989). Indeed the Laplacian school tried to account for
all terrestrial phenomena on the basis of central forces which, though either
attractive or repulsive, were modeled on gravitation. By then such forces
were considered mechanical (Fox, 1974). In the late nineteenth century,
mechanical explanations were challenged both by energetics (Ostwald, 1895)
and by the electromagnetic view of matter (McCormmach, 1970).
Yet it seems that in all these instances, answers were given to the question,
What are objects made of? They could be made of point particles acting
on each other (partly at least) without intermediaries. Or else they could be
made of energy, or of electromagnetic fields. But again, information is not on
a par with such potential constituents. Objects are not made of information.
Few people would go as far as advocating that the small-scale structure
of macroscopic objects simply does not require explanation. Yet something
close to this might be entailed by the idea of genuine fortuitousness. The
idea “implies that the basic event, a click in a counter, comes without any
cause and thus as a discontinuity in spacetime” (Bohr, Mottelson, & Ulfbeck,
2004, p. 405). Indeed
13This, by the way, is related to the reason why the epistemic view, even on its own
terms, won’t solve the measurement problem. The epistemic view is concerned with proba-
bilities of results of eventual macroscopic measurements. But it is not prepared to precisely
specify what a macroscopic apparatus is. It won’t tell us, for instance, just how small an
apparatus can be. To the credit of its proponents, none (as far as I know) has proposed a
purely arbitrary criterion like “an apparatus must have a mass greater than 1 g.” But are
there really any others?
13
[i]t is a hallmark of the theory based on genuine fortuitousness that
it does not admit physical variables. It is, therefore, of a novel kind
that does not deal with things (objects in space), or measurements,
and may be referred to as the theory of no things. (p. 410)
Genuine fortuitousness, it turns out, could pretty well fulfill the first
explanatory function of quantum mechanics, the one concerned with non-
classical correlations of macroscopic objects. Indeed it would be quite un-
objectionable, as an explanation of these correlations, in the hypothetical
world I have described in Sec. 4. But it fails to fulfill the second explanatory
function of quantum mechanics. When its proponents claim to eliminate
atoms or elementary particles, they seem always to have in mind their al-
leged role in producing a click or an ionisation track, rather than their role
in accounting for the structure of matter. In fact they cannot help contem-
plating the structure of macroscopic counters, when for instance they point
out that “the click involves such an immense number of degrees of freedom
that two clicks are never identical” (Ulfbeck and Bohr, 2001, p. 761). One
can immediately ask, How many degrees of freedom are there? What objects
do they characterize? Are these objects irreducible? And so on.
To sum up, neither the ether nor Bohmian trajectories have specific em-
pirical consequences. Yet in addition to defining a reference frame where
simultaneity would be absolute, the ether functioned as a kind of support for
electromagnetic phenomena. That role was transferred to the field when the
ether was discarded with the advent of special relativity. Bohmian trajecto-
ries, or other interpretative schemes of quantum mechanics, try to make the
basic variables of the theory, in terms of which the structure of macroscopic
objects is ultimately explained, intelligible. This role, I have argued, cannot
be dispensed with.
Acknowledgments
It is a pleasure to thank Pierre Gravel, Karl Hess, and Pierre Mathieu for
comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to several anonymous referees
whose comments contributed in sharpening the ideas presented in this paper.
14
References
Bell, J. S. (1976). How to teach special relativity. Reprinted in J. S. Bell,
Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics (pp. 67–80). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1987).
Bennett, C. H., & Brassard, G. (1984). Quantum cryptography: public
key distribution and coin tossing. In Proceedings of the IEEE international
conference on computers, systems and signal processing (pp. 175–179). New
York: IEEE.
Bohm, D. (1952). A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms
of ‘hidden’ variables (I and II). Physical Review, 85, 166–193.
Bohm, D., & Hiley, B. J. (1993). The undivided universe. London: Rout-
ledge.
Bohr, A., Mottelson, B. R., & Ulfbeck, O. (2004). The principle underlying
quantum mechanics. Foundations of Physics, 34, 405–417.
Brown, H. R. (2001). The origins of length contraction: I. The FitzGerald-
Lorentz deformation hypothesis. American Journal of Physics, 69, 1044–
1054.
Brown, H. R., & Wallace. D. (2005). Solving the measurement problem: de
Broglie-Bohm loses out to Everett. Foundations of Physics, 35, 517–540.
Bub, J. (2004). Why the quantum? Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 35, 241–266.
Bub, J. (2005). Quantum mechanics is about quantum information. Foun-
dations of Physics, 35, 541–560.
Clifton, R., Bub, J., & Halvorson, H. (2003). Characterizing quantum theory
in terms of information-theoretic constraints. Foundations of Physics, 33,
1561–1591.
Cushing, J. T. (1990). Theory construction and selection in modern physics.
The S Matrix. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cushing, J. T. (1998). Philosophical concepts in physics. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Darrigol, O. (2000). Electrodynamics from Ampe`re to Einstein. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
15
DeWitt, B. S. (1970). Quantum mechanics and reality. Physics Today, 23 (9),
30–35.
Einstein, A. (1905). On the electrodynamics of moving bodies. Translated
in The theory of relativity (pp. 35–65). New York: Dover (1952).
Einstein, A. (1949). Autobiographical notes. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), Albert
Einstein: philosopher-scientist (pp. 1–95). La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Everett, H. (1957). ‘Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics. Re-
views of Modern Physics, 29, 454–462.
Fox, R. (1974). The rise and fall of Laplacian physics. Historical Studies in
the Physical Sciences, 4, 89–136.
Fuchs, C. A. (2002). Quantum mechanics as quantum information (and only
a little more). In A. Khrennikov (Ed.), Quantum theory: reconsideration of
foundations (pp. 463–543). Va¨xjo¨, Sweden: Va¨xjo¨ University Press. Also
available as quant-ph/0205039.
Fuchs, C. A., & Peres, A. (2000). Quantum theory needs no ‘interpretation’.
Physics Today, 53 (3), 70–71.
Gardner, M. R. (1979). Realism and instrumentalism in 19th-century atom-
ism. Philosophy of Science, 46, 1–34.
Gru¨nbaum, A. (1973). Philosophical problems of space and time (2nd ed.).
Dordrecht: Reidel.
Halvorson, H. (2004). Remote preparation of arbitrary ensembles and quan-
tum bit commitment. quant-ph/0310001.
Holland, P. R. (1993). The quantum theory of motion. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Klein, M. J. (1972). Mechanical explanation at the end of the nineteenth
century. Centaurus, 17, 58–82.
Leggett, A. J. (2002). Testing the limits of quantum mechanics: motivation,
state of play, prospects. Journal of Physics: Condensed Matter, 14, R415–
R451.
Lorentz, H. A. (1909). The theory of electrons. Mineola, NY: Dover (Reprint
published 2003).
Marchildon, L. (2004). Why should we interpret quantum mechanics? Foun-
dations of Physics, 34, 1453–1466.
16
Maudlin, T. (1994). Quantum non-locality and relativity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Maxwell, J. C. (1873). A treatise on electricity and magnetism, Vols. 1 & 2.
New York: Dover (Reprint published 1954).
McCormmach, R. (1970). H. A. Lorentz and the electromagnetic view of
nature. Isis, 61, 459–497.
McMullin, E. (1989). The explanation of distant action: historical notes. In
J. T. Cushing & E. McMullin (Eds.), Philosophical consequences of quantum
theory (pp. 272–302). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Ostwald, F. W. (1895). Emancipation from scientific materialism. Trans-
lated in M. J. Nye (Ed.), The question of the atom (pp. 337–354). Los
Angeles: Tomash/American Institute of Physics (1984).
Pais, A. (1982). ‘Subtle is the Lord. . . ’ The science and the life of Albert
Einstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Paty, M. (1993). Einstein philosophe. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Poincare´, H. (1898). La mesure du temps. Translated in The value of science
(Chap. 2). New York: Dover (1958).
Poincare´, H. (1905). Sur la dynamique de l’e´lectron. Reprinted in Oeuvres
de Henri Poincare´, Vol. 9 (pp. 494–550). Paris: Gauthier-Villars (1950–65).
Rovelli, C. (1996). Relational quantum mechanics. International Journal of
Theoretical Physics, 35, 1637–1678.
Shor, P. W. (1994). Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete log-
arithms and factoring. In Proceedings of the 35th annual symposium on
foundations of computer science (pp. 124–134). Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE.
’t Hooft, G. (1999). Quantum gravity as a dissipative deterministic system.
Classical and Quantum Gravity, 16, 3263–79.
Timpson, C. G. (2004). Quantum information theory and the foundations of
quantum mechanics. Oxford University thesis. quant-ph/0412063.
Tumulka, R. (2004). Understanding Bohmian mechanics: a dialogue. Amer-
ican Journal of Physics, 72, 1220–1226.
Ulfbeck, O., & Bohr, A. (2001). Genuine fortuitousness. Where did that
click come from? Foundations of Physics, 31, 757–774.
Vandersypen, L. M. K., Steffen, M., Breyta, G., Yannoni, C. S., Sherwood,
17
M. H., & Chuang, I. L. (2001). Experimental realization of Shor’s quantum
factoring algorithm using nuclear magnetic resonance. Nature, 414, 883–887.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1991). Quantum mechanics: an empiricist view. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Vermaas, P. E. (1999). A philosopher’s understanding of quantum mechan-
ics. Possibilities and impossibilities of a modal interpretation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Von Neumann, J. (1932). Mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press (Translation published 1955).
Wallace, D. (2003). Everett and structure. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics, 34, 87–105.
Whittaker, E. T. (1951). A history of the theories of aether and electricity. I.
The classical theories. Los Angeles: Tomash/American Institute of Physics
(Reprint published 1987).
Zurek, W. H. (1991). Decoherence and the transition from quantum to clas-
sical. Physics Today, 44 (10), 36–44.
18
